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An Amendment to Protect Marriage: Bad in Theory,
Likely Worse in Practice
Mark Strasser*
I. INTRODUCTION
Passing a federal constitutional amendment to protect marriage was a
bad idea when initially proposed and, given how some of the recent state
constitutional amendments have been interpreted, is a worse idea now.
The Federal Marriage Protection Amendment (FMPA) was so open to
interpretation that individuals deciding whether to vote for it did not
know what it included and thus whether it deserved their support.
Further, when one considers how the federal courts have interpreted the
plain language of an existing constitutional provision, one can see that
even had the FMPA been better crafted, there would have been no basis
for confidence that the current difficulties in interpretation would thereby
have been averted.
Part II of this article examines some of the difficulties posed by the
current amendment and suggests that the reach of the amendment is far
from clear, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. Part III
considers some of the interpretations that have been offered of the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution and of various
state amendments, arguing that these interpretations foreshadow some of
the broad interpretations of the amendment that will be offered by some
courts. The Article concludes that the Federal Marriage Protection
Amendment, both as it has been proposed and as it likely will appear if
there is a modified proposal, should not be passed.
II. THE AMBIGUOUS FMPA
While seeming clear at first, the Federal Marriage Protection
Amendment is open to a variety of interpretations that would
significantly affect its reach. Commentators do not seem to appreciate
the multiple interpretations that it might be given and thus both the range
of interests that it might impact and the difficulties that would face
anyone who wished to seriously consider whether the amendment should
*
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be passed. Until these difficulties are addressed, it will be impossible
even for many of those who believe that marriage should be reserved for
different-sex couples1 to make an informed decision about whether the
amendment is worthy of support.
A. The Federal Marriage Protection Amendment
This past year, the following amendment, mirroring the 2004 Federal
Marriage Amendment, was proposed:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man
and a woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any
State, shall be construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and
a woman.2

On its face, the amendment appears to preclude a judge from finding
that a state constitution or the United States Constitution protects the
right of same-sex couples to marry or to receive benefits commonly
understood to be reserved for married couples. However, the clarity of
this amendment is illusory. Because there is no defined set of benefits
which qualify as “the incidents of marriage,” individuals deciding
whether to support the amendment have no way of knowing which
fundamental interests of the unmarried would be precluded by the
amendment from having constitutional protection.
The FMPA did not command the necessary majority when proposed
although it seems likely that some version of the amendment will again
be offered.3 While it is difficult to predict what the exact wording of any
future amendment will be, it seems safe to assume that certain features of
the FMPA will again be included when it or some version of it is
considered in Congress.4 Thus, an examination of the FMPA may well be

1. See Marc Spindelman, Yale, 102 MICH L REV. 1747, 1769 n.111 (2004) (discussing Orrin
Hatch’s suggestion that a federal marriage amendment should be adopted to protect democratic selfgovernment).
2. See S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2005), 151 CONG. REC. S146-01.The amendment
mirrors S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (July 7, 2004), so comments made about the latter amendment (the
Federal Marriage Amendment) would also apply to the Federal Marriage Protection Amendment.
3. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & E. Gary Spitko, Navigating Dangerous Constitutional
Straits: A Prolegomenon on the Federal Marriage Amendment and the Disenfranchisement of
Sexual Minorities, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 599, 604 (2005) (“DeLay suggests that the same-sex
marriage issue ‘is going to be huge’ in the future.”).
4. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to
Federalism in Family Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 167 (2004).
The form and wording may continue to evolve and improve. Regardless of the particular
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helpful in assessing the wisdom of future proposed amendments.
When construing a statute, one must first consider the text itself.5
Suppose we consider what the amendment would mean without the
phrase “or the legal incidents thereof.” Presumably, it would be
construed to mean that neither any state constitution nor the United
States Constitution should be interpreted to require that the status of
marriage be conferred upon any union of individuals not involving one
man and one woman.6 While the focus of the discussion here will not be
on this part of the amendment, one point might be made about the
proposed amendment even if the legal incidents language has been
removed, namely that it cannot correctly be characterized as simply
preventing “activist judges” from imposing their will on the American
people.7
A common interpretation of the first sentence of the amendment is
that no state will be permitted to recognize same-sex marriage.8 This
does not merely mean that “activist judges” are precluded from holding,
for example, that a state constitution protects this right, but also that the
populace of a particular state will be precluded from amending their own
state constitution to protect the right of same-sex couples to marry.
Commentators might point out that the FMPA says nothing about
what individuals are permitted to do with respect to ballot initiatives and
that the electorate of a particular state could, in fact, amend their own
state constitution to include a right to same-sex marriage. That is true but
irrelevant. Basically, if the FMPA were interpreted to preclude states
from protecting the right of same-sex couples to marry,9 then the state

wording or version, the gist of the FMA is that marriage is defined as a conjugal union
exclusively, that the courts may not compel the extension of marital status or of marital
incidents, benefits, duties, rights, and privileges that constitute the corpus of legal
marriage to other kinds of domestic unions, but that legislatures may resolve questions
about whether and if so what other status and/or what benefits may be extended to
nonmarital relationships.
Id.
5. Daniel B. Kelly, Recent Development, Defining Extortion: Rico, Hobbs, and Statutory
Interpretation in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003), 26
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 953, 969 (2003) (discussing one “of the few generally accepted concrete
rules of statutory construction: namely, . . . begin with the text of the statute”).
6. A separate issue beyond the purview of this article is whether this amendment would
permit a state to ignore a status already conferred.
7. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Restoring Democratic Self-Governance through the Federal
Marriage Amendment, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95, 110 (2004) (“The amendment must do three things.
First, it must protect the most important right of every citizen—the right of political selfgovernance.”); cf. Wardle, supra note 4, at 164-65 (“[A] significant minority of activist judges desire
to force the states to accept same-sex marriage or marriage-like unions.”).
8. See Collett, supra note 7, at 112 (stating “the current language is clear in its prohibition
of same-sex marriage”).
9. The amendment might be read only to preclude the federal government from protecting
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constitutional amendment described above could be passed but would
likely be held unenforceable by the courts because of the Supremacy
Clause of the Federal Constitution.10 Yet, if the first sentence of the
amendment precludes states from amending their own constitutions to
protect same-sex marriage, then the FMPA may be thwarting, rather than
protecting, self-government. Were FMPA proponents really concerned
about protecting the right of self-determination, they would delete the
first sentence of the proposed amendment.
Certainly, it might be pointed out that there does not seem to be a
huge outpouring of support in any state for amending that state’s
constitution to protect the right of same-sex couples to marry.11 That is
beside the point. The question is not merely what people think now but
what they may think in the future. Basically, the FMPA prevents the
future electorate of any state from expressing its will by voting to extend
constitutional protection to same-sex unions.12
Let us bracket this anti-democratic effect of the amendment for the
moment and instead ask, “What is added to the amendment by including
the phrase involving the legal incidents of marriage?” At least two
different points require clarification:
(1) Which benefits and obligations in particular are picked out by the
phrase “legal incidents of marriage?”
(2) What effect would this amendment have with respect to these
benefits?
Some commentators believe that the first question is not necessary to
ask, claiming that the term “incidents of marriage” is used routinely and
that its meaning is clear.13 Yet, the fact that the term is used often does
not establish that the term is used in the same way each time. Indeed,
some courts discussing the “incidents of marriage” have not been
referring to particular benefits at all but instead have merely been
discussing whether the court has jurisdiction to hear a particular matter.
Consider the following hypothetical: Jones is legally separated from
her husband. She now is domiciled in State A, whereas her husband is
still living in the state where he has always lived—State B. Jones can
such a right.
10. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
11. Cf. Collett, supra note 7, at 95 (“Public opinion polls show that Americans agree that
marriage should be defined as only the union of one man and one woman—often by a margin of two
to one.”).
12. See Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783,
797 (2004) (“The FMA would add to the Constitution a provision which restricts the ability of the
states to protect the fundamental right of marriage.”).
13. See Collett, supra note 7 at 111-12 (“Opponents also argue that the phrase ‘legal
incidents’ of marriage is unclear and will require extensive judicial interpretation. Yet this is a
phrase that has been used routinely in the discussion of marital rights.”).
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divorce her husband in her current domicile, notwithstanding that her
husband is not a domiciliary of State A and, indeed, has no contacts with
the state. The State A court, when deciding that it has jurisdiction to
grant the divorce, might use the term “incidents of marriage” to indicate
that the marriage itself is before the court and thus that the court has
jurisdiction to hear the case.14
Sometimes, the term “incidents of marriage” is used quite broadly15
and, it seems, this is the preferred interpretation of some commentators.
Yet, even when the term is being used broadly, formulations may differ
with respect to which benefits are included within the grouping
“incidents of marriage,” and thus litigation would likely follow the
passage of such an amendment, protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding.16
Consider the following formulations: Maggie Gallagher writes,
“Most of what are now routinely described as marriage benefits are more
accurately described as legal incidents of marriage: ways in which the
law treats a couple differently if they are married than if they are not.”17
Professor Collett offers a somewhat different description, suggesting that
“‘Legal incidents of marriage’ is . . . a phrase that indicates the rights,
privileges, duties, and responsibilities that arise from the legal
relationship of marriage.”18 Professor Wardle may be offering yet
another definition of the phrase when suggesting that these are the
“benefits, duties, rights, and privileges that constitute the corpus of legal
marriage.”19
While not making explicit which are the benefits, duties, etc., that
“constitute the corpus of marriage,” Professor Wardle may be
14. See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 209 N.E.2d 709, 711-12 (N.Y. 1965), quoted in Perrin
v. Perrin, 408 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 1969).
Since he was one party to the two-party contract of marriage he carried with him legal
incidents of the marriage itself, considered as an entity, which came before the court
when he personally appeared and presented his petition. In a highly mobile era such as
ours, it is needful on pragmatic grounds to regard the marriage itself as moving from
place to place with either spouse . . . .
Id.
15. Cf. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 74 (Haw. 1993) (Heen, J., dissenting).
This court should not manufacture a civil right which is unsupported by any precedent,
and whose legal incidents—the entitlement to those statutory benefits—will reach beyond
the right to enter into a legal marriage and overturn long standing public policy
encompassing other areas of public concern.
Id.
16. See Collett, supra note 7, at 111-12 (suggesting that extensive litigation would not be
required to resolve the meaning of the term).
17. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 38 (2004).
18. Collett, supra note 7, at 111-12.
19. Wardle, supra note 4, at 167.
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distinguishing between what is essential to marriage and what simply
happens to be accorded to married individuals. If so, that would mean
that the benefits which merely happen to be accorded to married people
would not be included among the incidents of marriage as he defines the
term, whereas Professor Collett’s formulation offers no such
qualification.
Suppose that a state were to accord particular benefits to all
household members. Would such a benefit be considered an incident of
marriage because it is something to which one might become entitled as
a result of marrying, or would it not be an incident of marriage because
unmarried individuals would also be entitled to it? If the incidents of
marriage are those benefits which one receives by virtue of marrying
and, for example, one is treated as a household member by virtue of
marrying someone, then benefits accorded to household members might
be thought of as incidents of marriage. If, on the other hand, the incidents
of marriage are limited to those benefits which capture some essential
element of marriage, then the fact that unmarried individuals, e.g., people
who were merely living together, might also be entitled to a particular
benefit would speak to the benefit’s not being classified as an incident of
marriage.
If the incidents of marriage must be associated with an important or,
perhaps, an intrinsic element of marriage, then it will be necessary to
decide which benefits meet that standard. Presumably, this matter would
have to be worked out in the courts, which means that there would likely
have to be a substantial amount of litigation to determine which benefits
would count as incidents and which would not.
Suppose that we adopt Maggie Gallagher’s proposal and just see
which benefits accorded to married couples are not accorded to nonmarital couples. This would have some unusual implications, one of
which is that some states simply would not have incidents of marriage.
For example, consider Connecticut and Vermont, whose legislatures
have passed legislation creating civil unions.20 Civil unions accord to
same-sex couples all of the benefits and obligations that are accorded to
married couples. In these states, where no benefits are specially reserved
for married couples, there would seem to be no incidents of marriage
using Maggie Gallagher’s definition.
Perhaps this is not an unwelcome result. In some states, the phrase
20. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204(a) (“Parties to a civil union shall have all the same
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from statute, administrative
or court rule, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a
marriage.”); see also Susan Haigh, Connecticut OKs gay civil unions; Grants same-sex pairs the
rights of married couples; bars weddings, REC. N. N.J., Apr. 21, 2005, 2005 WLNR 6298288
(noting that Connecticut will start recognizing civil unions as of October 1, 2005).
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“incidents of marriage” would not pick out any particular benefits, which
would mean not only that the legislature could accord those benefits, but
also that a court might find that those benefits had to be accorded as a
matter of constitutional right. In other states, however, the phrase
“incidents of marriage” would pick out particular benefits. In those
states, unmarried individuals would be barred from claiming those
benefits as a matter of constitutional right.
Commentators might disagree with the analysis set forth here. They
might suggest that the FMPA would preclude a Vermont court from
finding that a particular benefit of marriage had to be extended to nonmarital couples as a matter of constitutional right. After all, the
amendment states that no “constitution of any State shall be construed to
require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any
union other than the union of a man and a woman,”21 and it might turn
out that the majority of states consider the right to elect against a will, for
example, as an incident of marriage.
Yet, the focus of discussion here is how to determine which benefits
are incidents of marriage. If the incidents of marriage involve those
benefits reserved by a state for married couples, then it will not matter
what other states do—it will only matter which benefits are reserved for
married individuals by the particular state whose law is being challenged.
It is precisely for this reason that the FMPA puts no limitation on what
the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution protects,22
since no state benefits are reserved exclusively for married couples in
Vermont. Of course, there might well have been a limitation on the
courts before the Vermont Legislature passed the civil union bill, which
means that had the FMPA been in effect at the time Baker v. State23 was
issued, the decision might have been much different.24
Were we to have a federal law which determined who could marry
whom and which benefits were included among the incidents of
marriage, then we might refer to that statute to see whether a particular
benefit was an incident of marriage and thus could be reserved for
married couples without offending constitutional guarantees. Of course,
this would not resolve all of the issues, since a separate question would
be whether the amendment would be referring to those benefits
considered incidents of marriage at the time of the amendment’s
21. See S.J. Res. 1, 108th Cong. (Jan. 24, 2005).
22. Cf. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (holding that Common Benefits Clause
of the Vermont Constitution precluded reserving particular benefits for married couples).
23. Baker, 744 A.2d 864.
24. At the very least, the Baker court would have to have argued that the Vermont
Constitution guaranteed to all Vermont citizens certain benefits, none of which qualified as
“incidents of marriage” as the term was being used in the FMPA.
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adoption or instead, for example, at the time the cause of action accrued.
In any event, because we do not have a national marriage law,25 we must
use some other method to determine which benefits count as incidents of
marriage.
In a different context, Professor Collett suggests:
Some of the existing arrangements that would still be possible under
the FMA include Vermont civil unions, Hawaii reciprocal
beneficiaries, and New Jersey and California domestic partnerships.
Each is distinctive and responsive to the concerns of the people in the
state in which the laws were adopted. The FMA does not, and should
not, preclude such experimentation by the states where it represents the
will of the people, and is not imposed upon the people through some
act of willfulness by the judiciary.26

The issue of interest here is not whether a legislature could accord a
variety of benefits to individuals but whether a legislature’s doing so
might either change the character of the benefit or, perhaps, make clear
that the benefit in question was never an incident of marriage. Thus,
suppose a legislature decides to grant Benefit A to unmarried singles or
couples, not because it was forced to do so by a court but because it
believed its doing so was good public policy. If “incidents of marriage”
are reserved for married couples, then Benefit A could not be thought an
incident of marriage.
At least a few points are suggested by the above:
(1) What is an incident of marriage in one state might not be an
incident of marriage in another, and thus the FMPA might immunize

25. Perhaps the closest is the Defense of Marriage Act, which specifies some unions which
will not be considered marriages for federal purposes. See 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 (2005).
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the
word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
Id.
26. Collett, supra note 7, at 110; see also Wardle, supra note 4, at 152.
[T]he Federal Marriage Amendment clearly preserves the authority of legislatures, state
and federal, to enact laws providing “that (1) marital status or (2) the legal incidents
thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups .” Thus, it does not prohibit the
creation of another legal status equivalent to marriage—called, perhaps, “Civil Unions”
or “Domestic Partnerships” or “Reciprocal Beneficiaries”—nor does it prohibit the
extension of the same benefits given married couples to such alternative quasi-marital
unions, or the extension of any particular marital benefits and “incidents” to any
heterosexual or same-sex nonmarital couples—so long as it is done by the legislature.
Wardle, supra note 4, at 152.
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from constitutional attack a refusal to accord particular benefits to
unmarried persons in one state but not in another.
(2) What once was viewed as an incident of marriage might no
longer be so viewed once the state accorded the benefit at issue to any
unmarried individuals. Thus, a legislature that accords particular benefits
to some unmarried individuals would be making the refusal to accord
those benefits to other unmarried individuals potentially subject to
constitutional attack, i.e., would nullify the immunity from constitutional
attack offered by the FMPA.
(3) Assuming that (2) does not involve a one-way ratchet of some
sort, a state legislature might be able to reclassify particular benefits as
incidents of marriage by reserving them only for married individuals.
There would presumably be some limit on what could be (re)classified as
an incident of marriage. For example, the state could not classify the
right to vote as an incident of marriage.27 However, it is simply unclear
how that limitation would be spelled out.
By including the term “incidents of marriage” within the proposed
amendment without spelling out what the phrase means, the amendment
framers have given the courts a great deal of latitude when determining
which benefits fall within this category. Perhaps courts will do a stateby-state analysis, perhaps they will consider which benefits were
considered incidents of marriage at common law, or perhaps they will
use some other method. The amendment does not specify, which means
that it would be difficult for someone deciding whether to favor the
amendment to know what it is that the amendment immunizes from
constitutional review. Indeed, some of the benefits that FMPA
proponents believe are paradigmatic incidents of marriage might not be
so viewed in a state that permits non-married individuals to receive those
benefits as well.
B. What May be Included as Incidents of Marriage
While the amendment does not specify any incidents of marriage or
even offer a criterion by which courts could make that determination,
commentators are willing to offer examples of incidents of marriage.28
27. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 (1966).
But, of course, the States have no power to grant or withhold the franchise on conditions
that are forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, or any other provision of the
Constitution. Such exercises of state power are no more immune to the limitations of the
Fourteenth Amendment than any other state action. The Equal Protection Clause itself
has been held to forbid some state laws that restrict the right to vote.
Id.
28. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, Jr. & Spitko, supra note 3, at 648 (suggesting that they include
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Regrettably, it is sometimes difficult to tell why certain benefits are
thought to be incidents of marriage. It could be, for instance, that some
benefits are thought to be incidents of marriage because a particular state
treats them as such, because they were viewed at common law as
incidents of marriage, or because most states treat the benefits at issue as
incidents of marriage. Yet, without any elaboration or specification on
this matter, it is difficult to tell which benefits would be treated as
incidents of marriage as a federal constitutional matter, should that be
important to determine in the future.
Professor Wardle suggests that “the FMA would limit the ability of
state courts to extend particular benefits of incidents of marriage to
nonmarital homosexual or heterosexual couples, such as marital
testimonial privileges, custody, adoption, support, and property
division.”29 Regrettably, he fails to explain whether, for example, this list
would be applicable in Vermont, where none of these benefits is reserved
only for those who have married, or whether, instead, this list would only
be applicable in a state in which all of these benefits are reserved for
married couples.
Let us consider the issue of adoption. Most states permit non-married
individuals to adopt,30 so adoption is presumably not an incident of
marriage. In a state permitting second-parent adoptions,31 it would be
difficult to classify as an incident of marriage an adoption whereby two
unmarried adults would now be recognized as the parents of the same
child. Thus, it might be more difficult than first appears to determine
which benefits would be affected by the amendment.
The above point can be illustrated by considering a law like
Florida’s, which precludes many gays and lesbians from adopting.32
Because Florida permits singles to adopt,33 adoption itself is presumably
not an incident of marriage. Because it is not an incident of marriage, the
refusal to permit gays and lesbians to adopt would at least potentially be

“rights to visit a significant other in a hospital, to help make medical decisions if a loved one
becomes incapacitated, to have the state recognize the existence of parental rights”).
29. Wardle, supra note 4, at 167.
30. See Mark Strasser, Adoption, Best Interests, and the Constitution: On Rational Basis
Scrutiny and the Avoidance of Absurd Results, 5 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 297, 298 (2003).
31. Sara R. David, Turning Parental Rights into Parental Obligations—Holding Same-Sex,
Non-Biological Parents Responsible for Child Support, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 921, 928 (2005)
(“Second-parent adoptions are effectively step-parent adoptions that do not require the parents to be
married.”).
32. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(2)(c)(3) (West 2002) (“No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is homosexual.”). The statute has been construed only to limit
those who have been sexually active during the past year with someone of the same sex. See Lofton
v. Sec’y of the Dept. of Children and Fam. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806-07 (11th Cir. 2004).
33. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(2)(b) (West 2002).
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subject to constitutional challenge even if the FMPA was adopted
(although a separate issue would be whether the challenge itself would
be successful.)34
Nonetheless, there is at least one respect in which adoption might be
considered to be an incident of marriage if a state does not permit
second-parent adoptions. To see this point, a little background is
required. Traditionally, whenever someone adopted a child, the
biological parents had to surrender their parental rights.35 However, there
is an exception to this rule—every state permits stepparent adoptions,36
i.e., permits a spouse of a parent to adopt the parent’s child without
forcing the parent to surrender parental rights. For example, assume that
Wanda lost her husband years ago and has now remarried. Her current
husband, William, wishes to adopt her children. Assuming that Wanda
supports the adoption and that the adoption would promote the interests
of the children, William will be permitted to adopt the children without
Wanda being forced to give up her own parental rights. This is quite
sensible, given that both Wanda and William will be raising the children.
Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that Wanda lives next door to
another widow named Sandy. Sandy is living with—but not married to—
a man, Samuel, who wants to adopt her children. Suppose further that (1)
Sandy supports the adoption, (2) the adoption would promote the best
interests of her children, and (3) Sandy and Samuel are as committed to
each other as are Wanda and William. The issue of interest here is
whether there would be any significance to a state’s refusal to extend the
stepparent exception so that Samuel could adopt Sandy’s children
without Sandy’s having to surrender parental rights, i.e., whether a
state’s refusal to permit second-parent adoptions might have any
implications for what might be considered an incident of marriage.
Again, let us consider Florida law, which permits a stepparent to
adopt his or her spouse’s child without the spouse being forced to
surrender parental rights.37 While there seems to be no statute or reported
case law directly on point,38 it seems unlikely Florida would permit an
34. See Lofton, 358 F.3d 804 (upholding Florida’s adoption law).
35. Mark Strasser, Marriage, Parental Rights, and Public Policy: On the FMA, Its Purported
Justification, and Its Likely Effects on Families, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 118, 128 (2004)
(“Traditionally, whenever a child was adopted, the parental rights of the biological parents were
terminated.”).
36. Wendee M. Hilderbrand, When One Parent Goes and the Other Parent Stays: The
Inconsistency and Inequality of Guaranteeing Absent Parents Permanent Parental Rights, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 1907, 1919 (2003) (noting that all of the states permits stepparent adoptions under certain
conditions).
37. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(2)(c)(1) (West 2005).
38. The Florida statute does not address this kind of case, see id. at § 63.042, and a Westlaw
search does not reveal any cases dealing with the issue.
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unmarried individual to adopt his or her partner’s child without that
partner’s being forced to surrender parental rights. If Florida would not
allow that kind of adoption, then a stepparent adoption would likely be
viewed as an incident of marriage under Florida law.
Recently, Florida’s law banning gays and lesbians from adopting
children was upheld by the Eleventh Circuit.39 Suppose, however, that
the Eleventh Circuit had reached a different conclusion or, perhaps, that
the United States Supreme Court decided in a different case that such
bans violated federal constitutional guarantees. A separate question
would be whether the FMPA would immunize a state’s refusal to permit
second-parent adoptions from constitutional review. Arguably, it would.
Thus, even if a state’s prohibiting adoptions by gays or lesbians would
violate equal protection guarantees, the FMPA might immunize from
constitutional review a decision by a state to preclude the members of a
non-marital couple from each establishing parental rights to the same
child. Basically, according to one interpretation of the amendment, the
FMPA would carve out from federal or state constitutional review a
state’s decision not to accord the incidents of marriage to any nonmarital couple, even assuming that the decision could not pass muster
under equal protection or due process analysis.40
Suppose that it were claimed that the incidents of marriage should
not be determined in light of which benefits are reserved for married
couples by a particular state but, instead, should be understood to involve
certain core areas, such as custody, adoption, support, and property
division.41 This might mean that a state’s refusal to permit non-married
individuals to have benefits in these areas would be immune from
constitutional review.42 Indeed, not only might a state’s refusal to allow
all unmarried individuals to adopt or have custody be immune from
constitutional scrutiny, but a state’s decision to allow only certain
unmarried individuals to adopt or have custody might be immune from
constitutional scrutiny. In short, a possible interpretation of the FMPA is
that states’ decisions with respect to which unmarried individuals would
39. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th
Cir. 2004).
40. Cf. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Spitko, supra note 3, at 615 (“This drastic step—repealing the
protections of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses—is, of course, what the proponents of a
Federal Marriage Amendment implicitly have proposed.”).
41. See generally Wardle, supra note 4, at 167.
42. But see Granholm v. Heald, 125 S.Ct. 1885, 1903 (2005) (“[T]he Twenty-first
Amendment does not supersede other provisions of the Constitution . . . .”); Krotoszynski, Jr. &
Spitko, supra note 3, at 602 (“Because a Federal Marriage Amendment would contravene the deeply
embedded constitutional ideals of equal protection and due process, it would invite a narrow
interpretation that might undercut its effectiveness at preserving marriage rights for heterosexual
relationships only.”).
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receive any of the benefits within the “incidents of marriage” category
would be free from constitutional challenge: States could discriminate on
the basis of orientation, sex, race, religion, etc., without fear that their
laws would be struck down as violating state or federal constitutional
guarantees.
There might be significant ramifications were the FMPA interpreted
to exempt the non-awarding of certain core benefits to the unmarried
from constitutional review. Not only might equal protection guarantees
be rendered inoperable with respect to the withholding of benefits to
particular unmarried individuals, but substantive due process guarantees
might be similarly so treated. Consider the right to custody of one’s
biological child, a fundamental interest with which the state cannot
interfere without compelling justification.43 If custody is an incident of
marriage, then statutes adversely affecting the custodial rights of the
unmarried might be immunized from state and federal constitutional
scrutiny. Were a state legislature to decide that the parental rights of
never-married parents should be terminated so that their children could
be placed in marital homes, there would be no recourse to constitutional
protections.
Suppose that the FMPA had been adopted and the facts of Stanley v.
Illinois44 were before the Court. The mother of three children dies.45 The
father of the children with whom she had been living but whom she had
never married is presumed by the state’s laws to be an unfit parent.46 He
challenges the law. While the Stanley Court struck down the statute,47 the
Supreme Court might now have to uphold the law, because the equal
protection48 and due process49 guarantees of the Federal Constitution
43. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case-the
interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
44. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
45. Id. at 646.
46. See id. at 647 (“The State continues to respond that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to
raise their children and that it is unnecessary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether
particular fathers are in fact unfit parents before they are separated from their children.”).
47. See id. at 649.
48. The Stanley Court struck down the law as a violation of equal protection guarantees. See
id. at 649 (“[B]y denying him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their
children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
49. The Stanley Court suggested that the Due Process Clause also established the
unconstitutionality of the statute in question. See id. at 657-58.
We think the Due Process Clause mandates a similar result here. The State’s interest in
caring for Stanley’s children is de minimis if Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists
on presuming rather than proving Stanley’s unfitness solely because it is more convenient
to presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage is insufficient to
justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his
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would simply be inapplicable when the custodial rights of an unmarried
parent were at issue. The Court might recognize that the application of
this law would result in the children’s losing both of their parents—one
through death and the other through the operation of law—but would
note that this regrettable result speaks to the wisdom of the statute, a
matter to be addressed to the Legislature rather than the Court.
Perhaps the FMPA would not permit invidious discrimination.
This would depend upon how it was interpreted and whether, for
example, it would be interpreted to repeal all constitutional guarantees
with respect to a defined set of benefits for those who were not married.
Given how some state and federal constitutional provisions have been
interpreted, it seems clear that some members of the Court would
interpret the FMPA to permit states to pass arguably invidiously
discriminatory legislation,50 although it is simply unclear whether that
view would be shared by a majority on the Court.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Recently, several states amended their state constitutions to preclude
the recognition of same-sex marriage. Those amendments have required
interpretation, and some interpretations now appear in case law. Further,
during the past several years, the United States Supreme Court has been
significantly revising its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. The
state and federal courts’ interpretations of these amendments should not
give comfort to anyone predicting that the FMPA will be construed in a
particular way. On the contrary, the interpretations offered of some of the
state amendments and the current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
should make everyone wary of how the FMPA might be interpreted by
the courts.
A. State Constitutional Interpretation
In 2004, several states adopted constitutional amendments respecting
marriage.51 While each was designed to prohibit same-sex marriages, the

family.
Id.
50. In both Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), the majority struck down what it viewed as invidiously discriminatory legislation. In both
cases, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas believed the legislation permissible, even without the
FMPA. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). It would not be difficult to imagine that these Justices would read the amendment as
immunizing certain kinds of restrictions from constitutional review.
51. Same-sex marriage: Simply put, he explained, ECONOMIST 82, 3/19/05, 2005 WLNR
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content of the various amendments differed and their scope required
interpretation by the courts. Some of the state court interpretations
should give pause to those pushing for the adoption of the FMPA.
In November of 2004, the following constitutional amendment was
passed by referendum in Ohio:
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage
valid in or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions. This
state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.52

Ohio courts have tried to spell out the effects of this amendment. For
example, one issue on which courts have not been able to agree is
whether the amendment invalidates the application of the state’s
domestic violence statute to non-marital couples. Some courts have
concluded that the second sentence of the amendment precludes the state
from extending to non-marital, cohabiting partners the protections that
would be extended to a spouse,53 while others have concluded that the
amendment does not preclude the extension of such benefits.54
The claim here is not that being free from domestic violence should
be thought a benefit reserved for married couples. Indeed, at common
law, one spouse would be immune from civil suit by the other spouse for
injuries which would have been actionable had the individuals never
married,55 so protection from domestic violence does not seem to be one
of the paradigmatic incidents of marriage. Nonetheless, if the language of
the Ohio amendment can be construed to preclude protection against
domestic violence for non-marital couples, the FMPA would likely be
analogously construed by some courts, e.g., to suggest that a failure to
provide domestic violence protection to the unmarried is immune from

4227351 (“Of the 17 states that have changed their constitutions to ban same-sex marriages, only
Nebraska, Nevada, Alaska and Hawaii did so before 2004. The other 13 did so in 2004—the year not
just of the San Francisco change but also of same-sex legalisation in Massachusetts.”).
52. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
53. See City of Cleveland v. Voies, No. 2005 CRB 002653, 2005 WL 1940135 (Ohio Mun.
Mar. 23, 2005); State v. Peterson, No. 2004 CR 873, 2005 WL 1940114 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 18, 2005);
State v. Dixon, No. 2005 CR 0091, 2005 WL 1940110 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 26, 2005); State v.
Steineman, 2005 CR 0068, 2005 WL 1940104 (Ohio C.P. Apr. 26, 2005).
54. See State v. Burk, No. 86162, 2005 WL 3475812 (Ohio App. Dec. 20, 2005); State v.
Newell, No. 2004 CA 00264, 2005 WL 1364937, at 4 (Ohio App. May 31, 2005); City of Cleveland
v. Knipp, No. 2004 CRB 039103, 2005 WL 1017620 (Ohio Mun. Mar. 10, 2005); State v. Rogers,
827 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Misc. 2005); State v. McIntosh, No. 2004 CR 4712, 2005 WL 1940099 (Ohio
C.P. Apr. 18, 2005).
55. See generally Merenoff v. Merenoff, 388 A.2d 951, 953 (N.J. 1978).
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constitutional challenge.
If the FMPA could be interpreted to immunize the failure to extend
domestic violence protections to non-marital couples, one might wonder
what other benefits might also be so treated. For example, consider the
Nebraska constitutional amendment, which is as follows: “Only marriage
between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska.
The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in Nebraska.”56
The Nebraska Attorney General interpreted the amendment as
precluding the legislature from giving a domestic partner the right to
control the disposition of a decedent’s remains.57 A host of other
benefits, e.g. hospital visitation and medical decision-making, were also
at least arguably affected by the State Attorney General’s broad
interpretation of the amendment.58
It is unclear whether the Nebraska amendment was intended to be
given this broad scope. Suppose, however, that it had been so intended
and suppose further that it had been adopted for invidious reasons. If the
FMPA were passed, such broad statutes or amendments, if drafted in a
particular way, might be immunized from constitutional review.
The FMPA language targets the “incidents of marriage” and does not
even mention same-sex relationships. If a state adopted legislation which
precluded same-sex but not different-sex unmarried couples from
receiving certain benefits, the FMPA presumably would not apply and
the classification might be challenged on constitutional grounds.59
However, if instead the state decided to reserve certain benefits only for
married couples, that legislative decision might be immune from
constitutional scrutiny, even if that classification were enacted for
invidious reasons.
Proponents of the FMPA often claim that it is necessary to preserve
different-sex marriage.60 Suppose that we bracket that permitting same-

56. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29, held unconstitutional by Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v.
Bruning, 368 F.Supp. 2d 980 (D.Neb. 2005).
57. See Citizens for Equal Protection, 368 F. Supp.2d at 987-88 (D.Neb. 2005).
58. Cf. id. at 1000 (suggesting that the amendment might preclude “passage of legislation
that would make domestic partners responsible for each others’ living expenses; allow a partner
hospital visitation; provide for a partner to make decisions regarding health care, organ donations
and funeral arrangements; permit bereavement leave; permit private employer benefits; allow
survivorship, intestacy and elective share; and permit same-sex couples to adopt children”).
59. But see supra text accompanying notes 41-42 (suggesting that if incidents of marriage are
construed as picking out certain benefits rather than as being determined in light of the benefits
reserved for marital couples, then constitutional challenges might not be available even if certain
benefits are accorded to some but not all unmarried individuals).
60. W. Todd Akin, Debunking “Conservative” Arguments Against the Federal Marriage
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sex couples to marry will not somehow preclude different-sex couples
from marrying. Suppose that we also bracket the implausibility of the
claims either that different-sex couples will not marry if same-sex
couples are permitted to do so or that different-sex couples will divorce
when they otherwise would not have if same-sex couples are permitted to
marry.61 It should be clear that passing an amendment which could
remove possible constitutional protections for visiting loved ones in the
hospital or, perhaps, for disposing of the remains of a loved one is not
only not going to save marriage but is heartless and cruel.
If the sole issue were the importance of preserving marriage for
different-sex couples,62 one would expect that the “incidents of
marriage” language in the second sentence of the FMPA would be
unnecessary. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the
majority of Americans wish to preserve marriage for different-sex
couples but do not feel the same way with respect to the allocation of the
benefits of marriage.63
B. How Would a Carefully Crafted Amendment Be Interpreted by the
Federal Courts?
While the state constitutional amendments have been construed in a
variety of ways, it might be thought that a federal amendment would be
narrowly construed. Yet, a brief consideration of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence illustrates that even a better–crafted amendment might be
interpreted in a variety of ways.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.”64
This amendment might seem relatively straightforward.65 On its face,
Amendment, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 219, 221 (2004) (“[W]e must pursue a
Federal Marriage Amendment . . . to preserve the institution of marriage . . . .”).
61. Cf. Mark Strasser, Sodomy, Adultery, and Same-Sex Marriage: On Legal Analysis and
Fundamental Interests, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 313, 323 (1998) (recognizing same-sex marriages
“would be unlikely to undermine other relationships and it would be most surprising, for example,
for opposite-sex couples to seek divorces because same-sex couples had been allowed to marry”).
62. See Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage,
2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 7 (2004) (suggesting that most Americans wish to preserve marriage for
different-sex couples).
63. See id. at 9 (“One recent poll shows that 55 percent think that there should be Social
Security benefits for gay partners. Only 36 percent are opposed.”).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
65. For a discussion of why the language “shall not be construed” makes the amendment
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it suggests that the federal courts will not have jurisdiction to hear a suit
by a citizen of one state against another state. The amendment says
nothing about a citizen suing her own state nor does it say anything about
a state’s being able to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts by
agreeing to be sued there. Yet, the Court has interpreted the amendment
to bar suits by citizens against their own states66 and to not bar suits by
citizens of other states if the state has no objection to appearing in federal
court.67
A consideration of the historical context in which the amendment
was adopted suggests that the amendment might have been adopted to
limit the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction.68 Be that as it may, the
current Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence does not closely follow the
text.69
What implications does this have for the FMPA? First, the Court
may well not feel bound by the text,70 which means that the Court might
offer a broad range of interpretations of the text. For example, the Court
might read the amendment as a partial limitation on Fourteenth
Amendment protections or, perhaps, might take a very different approach
and read the amendment as imposing restrictions on different-sex
marriages because of equal protection guarantees.71
At least one of the lessons of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is
that the Court may not feel constrained by the words of the amendment
and instead may try to capture what it symbolizes.72 This means that it
much less clear than might originally be supposed, see Mark Strasser, Hans, Ayers, and Eleventh
Amendment Jurisprudence: On Justification, Rationalization and Sovereign Immunity, 10 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 251, 254-56 (2001).
66. Idaho v. Coeur D’alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997) (“[W]e have extended a
State’s protection from suit to suits brought by the State’s own citizens.”).
67. Id. at 267 (rejecting “that the Eleventh Amendment, like the grant of Article III, § 2,
jurisdiction, is cast in terms of reach or competence, so the federal courts are altogether disqualified
from hearing certain suits brought against a State”).
68. See generally Mark Strasser, Chisholm, The Eleventh Amendment, and Sovereign
Immunity: On Alden’s Return to Confederation Principles, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 605 (2001).
69. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999) (“Although the text of the Amendment
would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, ‘we have
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” (citing Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775,
779 (1991))).
70. Cf. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Spitko, supra note 3, at 620 (2005) (“The lesson here is quite
clear: the Supreme Court does not hold itself bound to traditional canons of statutory interpretation
when interpreting constitutional text.”).
71. Id. at 625 (“We conclude that neither version of the Federal Marriage Amendment would
preclude a future Supreme Court from holding that a state’s failure to recognize same-sex marriage
while recognizing mixed-sex marriage constitutes invidious sex discrimination in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.”).
72. Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779 (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it
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might be very difficult for those proposing the amendment to achieve
particular defined ends, even if they are very careful in how they craft the
language of the amendment. Yet, the FMPA is not particularly well
crafted, since it leaves so much open to interpretation. No one can say
what the Court would do if forced to interpret the amendment—the only
safe bet is that some would be very surprised by the Court’s decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The proposed Federal Marriage Amendment is unwise for a variety
of reasons. Its scope is extremely unclear, as is illustrated by some of the
interpretations that have been given to state marriage amendments.
Further, there is reason to believe that the United States Supreme Court
would not feel particularly constrained by the amendment’s language,
even were it not so open to interpretation.
FMPA proponents have offered a variety of reasons for the
amendment, but many of those reasons do not withstand scrutiny. Were
federalism really the goal, the amendment would not attempt to tie the
hands of the states in how they amended their own constitutions. Were
protecting marriage the goal, the amendment (1) would do something
which was more likely to protect marriage in fact, and (2) would not
enable states to impose cruel burdens on disfavored minorities.
Because the focus of this discussion has been on whether passage of
the FMPA is wise, very little attention has been paid to the merits of
recognizing same-sex marriage. Perhaps a few words on that matter
should be included.
Maggie Gallagher argues that married couples receive certain
benefits because of the “law’s perception of spouses as each others’
closest kin. The law is doing justice to the relation that actually exists
between spouses . . . , rather than creating a basket of legal goodies to
help reward married couples.”73 This is at least one of the reasons that
same-sex couples should have the right to marry—the law should do
justice to the relation that actually exists. Same-sex couples have the
same kinds of relationships that different-sex couples have. They may
have children to raise or elderly parents who need their care. They may
wish to cement their union as a matter of religious belief and, indeed,
may be able to celebrate their union within their faith tradition. They
seek to marry for many of the same reasons that different-sex couples
seek to marry and have many of the same roles, e.g., as caring parent,
confirms . . . .”).
73. Maggie Gallagher, (How) Will Gay Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution: A
Reply to Andrew Koppelman, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 33, 39 (2004).
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child or helpmate, as do members of other couples.
Some FMPA proponents suggest that it is anti-family to point out
that many married couples do not have children, and that many children
are not being raised by both of their biological parents.74 Such a
suggestion is regrettable for several reasons. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that the “demographic changes of the past century
make it difficult to speak of an average American family” and that the
“composition of families varies greatly from household to household.”75
Pretending that the “average American family” is other than what it is
will not change the nature of that family. However, it may result in many
American families having a much harder time staying together and in
many parents having a much harder time providing for their children,
results which no one should want.
The FMPA is exactly the sort of amendment which should not be
proposed and certainly should not be adopted. One can only hope that the
Congress and the American people will continue to have the wisdom to
reject this Pandora’s box, whose foreseeable consequences are not
pleasant to contemplate and whose currently unforeseeable consequences
would likely produce lamentations even from those who had once been
its supporters.

74. Id. at 61 (suggesting that the importance of procreation and its relationship to marriage
are downgraded by the observation that many children are raised by single parents and in homes in
which one of the parents has no biological connection to the child).
75. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).

